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The question of whether an invention is an obvious variation of 
existing technology is one that has troubled courts for decades.  
From its roots in nineteenth century case law to the recent Supreme 
Court decision KSR v. Teleflex, Inc.,2 the doctrine of obviousness has 
waxed and waned—moving through a variety of judicially-created 
tests to a current state that is still far from perspicuous.  
This paper will examine obviousness through a particular lens: 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO,” “PTO”) tool 
known as “official notice”—the practice of declaring a patent appli-
cation’s claims unpatentable as obvious based on undocumented 
reasoning, such as the common sense or common knowledge of a 
person having ordinary skill in the art to which the application per-
tains.3  After KSR, using unsubstantiated common sense-based ra-
tionales for rejecting patent claims is considered a completely valid 
practice.4  However, a line of obviousness cases, including one from 
the United States Supreme Court, stands for the polar opposite posi-
tion—that declaring a patent invalid as obvious without underlying 
prior art support does not comport with the standards of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act.5  Unfortunately, this contradiction leaves 
patent practitioners and the federal district courts to reconcile dia-
metrically opposed holdings, especially when a case involves official 
notice.   
Part II of this paper will give a brief history of general obvious-
ness jurisprudence up to the Supreme Court’s KSR decision in 2007.  
Next, Part III will introduce the reader to the obviousness inquiry 
through the eyes of a USPTO examiner by presenting a hypothetical 
  
 1. VOLTAIRE, DICTIONNAIRE PHILOSOPHIQUE (1764). 
2.  550 U.S 398 (2007). 
3.  See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2144.03 (8th ed. Rev. 8, 
July 2010) [hereinafter MPEP]. 
4.  See, e.g., KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. 
5.  Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999). 
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patent application scenario and defining various terms of art.  Part IV 
will introduce the concept of formal official notice at the USPTO, 
including an examination of the official agency guidelines for the 
practice, and will present a judicial history of official notice.  Part V 
will return to KSR, presenting more recent Federal Circuit obvious-
ness cases and introducing the problems that the current jurispru-
dence brings about.  Finally, Part VI will conclude with potential 
solutions to the issue, arguing that the judiciary should hold the 
USPTO to task in providing evidence that an invention is in fact ob-
vious.  
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF OBVIOUSNESS JURISPRUDENCE: TOWARD A 
FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO THE § 103 INQUIRY 
In 1952, Congress passed the Patent Act, which specifies many 
requirements that an applicant must fulfill to obtain a patent—best 
mode, patentable subject matter, written description, enablement, 
and novelty, to name a few.
6
  However, the most frequently litigated 
section of the Patent Act mandates that, to obtain a United States 
patent, one must present an invention that is nonobvious.
7
  Specifi-
cally, the statute mandates that: 
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between 
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are 
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been ob-
vious at the time the invention was made to a person having 
ordinary skill in the art . . . .
8
   
Interestingly, though the nonobviousness requirement of § 103 is 
currently mandated by statute, before 1952, the nonobviousness re-
quirement was developed and enforced by the federal courts.
9
  In 
1850, the Supreme Court decided Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,
10
 holding 
that some form of inventive ingenuity greater than that held by 
  
 6. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2010). 
 7. Id. § 103(a) (2010). 
 8. Id. 
 9. See id. 
 10. 52 U.S. 248 (1850). 
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someone familiar with the art is needed for patentability.
11
  Hotch-
kiss involved a rather simple technological improvement: the substi-
tution of clay or porcelain for wood or metal in a doorknob.
12
  The 
Court held that such an improvement was “the work of the skilful 
mechanic, not that of the inventor,” and held that the patent at issue 
was invalid.
13
  Notably, although Hotchkiss did not specifically re-
cite the word “nonobviousness,” it did emphasize the idea of the or-
dinary knowledge of one of skill in the art when attempting to define 
“invention.”14 
A. Graham v. Deere and the TSM Test: Defining the Obviousness 
Standard 
Over a decade after Congress’s codification of the nonobvious-
ness requirement, the Supreme Court again took on the nonobvious-
ness principle in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City
15
 in an 
effort to define a discernable judicial and administrative standard for 
§ 103’s application.16  Graham involved the validity of an issued 
patent drawn to a field plow improvement, which the Court ultimate-
ly deemed obvious in view of the prior art.
17
  More important than 
the ultimate invalidity determination, however, was the obviousness 
test the Court formulated.  The Graham standard, which is used to 
this day both in the federal courts and at the USPTO included three 
technical factors, commonly referred to as the “primary Graham 
factors”:  
Under section 103, [1] the scope and content of the prior art 
are to be determined; [2] differences between the prior art 
and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and [3] the level 
  
 11. Id. at 267 (“[U]nless more ingenuity and skill . . . were required . . . than 
were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was 
an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements 
of every invention.”). 
 12. Id. at 249.    
 13. Id. at 267. 
 14. See id. at 266 (“The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or inven-
tion.”). 
 15. 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
16.  Id. at 18. 
 17. Id. at 21, 37. 
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of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved.  Against this 
background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the sub-
ject matter is determined.
18
  
After Graham, the USPTO, district courts, and the Federal Cir-
cuit were left to apply the Graham test in a coherent manner.  Unfor-
tunately, at the outset, consistent application of the test was rather 
difficult.
19
  In an effort to cure this challenge during the second half 
of the twentieth century, the Federal Circuit layered a test over the 
Graham standard: the “teaching, suggestion, or motivation test”—
often referred to as the “TSM test.”20  Under the TSM test, “[t]he 
party seeking patent invalidity based on obviousness must . . . show 
some motivation or suggestion to combine . . . prior art teachings.”21 
The TSM test was not, in theory, limited to explicit teachings—
courts could also employ more nebulous “implicit” nods to a teach-
ing, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art.
22
  Before 2007, the 
Federal Circuit had identified two such implicit sources to satisfy the 
TSM test: the particular nature of the problem the patent-at-issue 
was attempting to remedy and the general knowledge of a person 
having ordinary skill in the art (“PHOSITA”).23   
  
 18. Id. at 17. 
 19. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 18 (“This is not to say, however, that there will not 
be difficulties in applying the nonobviousness test. . . . The difficulties, however, 
are comparable to those encountered daily by the courts in such frames of refer-
ence as negligence and scienter, and should be amenable to a case-by-case devel-
opment.”). 
 20. See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407 (2007). 
 21. Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323–24 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  
One of the newly-created Federal Circuit’s first and clearest pronouncements of 
the existence of the TSM test was its decision in ACS Hospital Sys., Inc. v. Mon-
tefiore Hospital, 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984), in which the court held 
that “[u]nder section 103, teachings of references can be combined only if there is 
some suggestion or incentive to do so.” (emphasis added).  
 22. In re Sernaker, 702 F.2d 989, 994 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (reviewing the prior art to 
determine if “all or any of the references would have suggested (expressly or by 
implication) the possibility of achieving further improvement by combining such 
teachings along the line of the invention in suit . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 23. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 987–88 (Fed. Cir. 2006); In re Rouffet, 149 
F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Pro-Mold & Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, 
75 F.3d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
File: Sheets - Vol 10, Iss. 1, V4 Created on:  6/1/2012 2:03:00 PM Last Printed: 6/1/2012 2:04:00 PM 
168          UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 10 No.1   
This “implicit reasoning” is not to say that courts or examiners 
were permitted to manufacture a motivation—the reasoning must 
have been clearly articulated and the basis for such an implication 
must have had a concrete and identifiable foundation.
24
  Therefore, 
even though a court or examiner could rely on an implicit TSM test 
justification, the implication must have ultimately traced back to an 
explicitly articulated theory or underpinning in the body of prior art 
available to a PHOSITA.
25
  As a consequence, an explicit prior art 
articulation ultimately arose from a correct employment of the im-
plicit TSM doctrine, and one can argue that, at the end of the day, 
drawing a line between implicit and explicit TSM reasoning was 
extremely difficult if not impossible.  In effect, therefore, the strong-
est showing of a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine pri-
or art references under § 103 lay in an explicit prior art pronounce-
ment, while an implicit reasoning tended to raise the judicial brow if 




B. KSR v. Teleflex, Inc.: The Supreme Court Validates “Common 
Sense” as a Premise for Obviousness Rejections 
In 2007, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in KSR In-
ternational Co. v. Teleflex Inc.
27—a decision that undoubtedly made 
an initial determination of obviousness easier to justify.  KSR in-
volved the validity of a patent issued to Steven J. Engelgau and ex-
clusively licensed to Teleflex that claimed an electronic device at-
tached to an adjustable car pedal that controlled the vehicle’s throttle 
through the on-board computer.
28
  The prior art of relevance in KSR 
included: (1) an adjustable pedal patent issued to Asano, wherein 
one pivot point or the pedal remained fixed; (2) a sensor patent is-
sued to Smith, which placed a sensor on a pedal assembly to prevent 
  
 24. See, e.g., In re Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988. 
 25. See id.  
 26. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988; In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1447 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992) (“There must be some reason, suggestion, or motivation found in the 
prior art whereby a person of ordinary skill in the field of invention would make 
the combination.”) (emphasis added); infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 27. 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 28. Id. at 405–06. 
File: Sheets - Vol 10, Iss. 1, V4 Created on: 6/1/2012 2:03:00 PM Last Printed: 6/1/2012 2:04:00 PM 
2012 A LITTLE COMMON SENSE IS A DANGEROUS THING 169 
wire wear; and (3) an adjustable pedal patent issued to Rixon, which 
claimed the placement of an electronic sensor in the pedal footpad.
29
  
The trial court found the Engelgau patent obvious at summary 
judgment.
30
  Applying the primary Graham factors, the court found 
“little difference” between the prior art and the Engelgau patent-at-
issue, holding that the Asano prior art patent taught almost every-
thing claimed in the Engelgau patent, and the remaining claim fea-
tures were revealed in other prior art.
31
  Applying the mandated TSM 
test, the court found a motivation to combine the prior art references 
because:  
(1) [T]he state of the industry would lead inevitably to com-
binations of electronic sensors and adjustable pedals, (2) 
Rixon provided the basis for these developments, and (3) 
Smith taught a solution to the wire chafing problems in Rix-
on, namely, locating the sensor on the fixed structure of the 
pedal.
32
   
Teleflex appealed the trial court ruling, and the Federal Circuit 
reversed, reasoning that the district court had not been strict enough 
in its application of the TSM test.
33
  The Federal Circuit held that 
looking to any conceivable motivation to combine prior art refer-
ences was not enough to satisfy the TSM test.
34
  Instead, the court 
stated that the prior art must address the “precise problem that the 
patentee was trying to solve,” because otherwise “the problem would 
not motivate an inventor to look at those references.”35 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to both expound on the va-
lidity of the TSM test and, if it was to survive, to formulate its cor-
rect application in the future.
36
  First, in reversing the Federal Cir-
cuit, the Court flatly rejected the court’s rigid approach to the TSM 
test and stated that, when applied in a flexible manner, the TSM test 
  
 29. Id. at 408–09. 
 30. Id. at 412. 
 31. Id. at 413. 
 32. Id. 
 33. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 413 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
 34. Id. at 413–14. 
 35. Id. at 414 (citing, in first quotation, Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 F. 
App’x 282, 288 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).  
 36. See id. at 407. 
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is valid and consistent with the Court’s precedent.37  Expounding on 
the test’s correct application going forward, the Court stated that 
“[t]he obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic con-
ception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by 
overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explic-
it content of issued patents.”38  Rather, the Court held, “[r]igid pre-
ventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense . . . 
are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it.”39 
This pronouncement would seem to depart from a tradition in the 
decades leading up to the KSR decision wherein a teaching, sugges-
tion, or motivation was most often considered grounded when sup-
ported by a direct and explicit mention in a published document.
40
  
Instead, by declaring such a judicial demand for support in publica-
tions or issued patents unwarranted—and declaring “common sense” 
a viable source of a motivation to combine prior art references—the 
Court opened the door for a tidal wave of new common sense-based 
motivation to combine arguments for those seeking to invalidate a 
patent as a defense in an infringement suit. 
Finally, the Court declared: 
When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a 
problem and there are a finite number of identified, predicta-
ble solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to 
pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp.  
If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product 




 37. See id. at 415 (“Throughout this Court’s engagement with the question of 
obviousness, our cases have set forth an expansive and flexible approach incon-
sistent with the way the Court of Appeals applied its TSM test here.”). 
 38. Id. at 419 (emphasis added). 
 39. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (emphasis 
added).  Additionally, the Court addressed the issue of “common sense” of the 
PHOSITA when it stated that “[c]ommon sense teaches . . . that familiar items 
may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a person 
of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like 
pieces of a puzzle.” Id. at 420. 
 40. See supra Part II.A. 
 41. KSR, 550 U.S. at 421 (emphasis added).   
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Ultimately, applying the correct analysis to the case’s facts, the 
Court stated that “[t]he proper question to have asked was whether a 
pedal designer of ordinary skill, facing the wide range of needs cre-
ated by developments in the field of endeavor, would have seen a 
benefit to upgrading Asano with a sensor.”42  The Court concluded 
that a PHOSITA would have seen this benefit,
43
 and remanded the 
case.
44
  Thus, the upshot of the Court’s KSR opinion was that “com-
mon sense” of a PHOSITA could serve as a valid foundation for an 
obviousness rejection by an examiner or satisfaction of the TSM test 
by a court.
45
   
III. TEACHING, SUGGESTION, OR MOTIVATION ON THE GROUND: A 
HYPOTHETICAL  
As discussed above, to prove obviousness in the pre-KSR world, 
an examiner or patent validity challenger needed to come forward 
with some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine references 
under the TSM test, which was most often found explicitly in the 
prior art.
46
  A USPTO practice known as official notice, which al-
lowed an examiner to reject a claim as obvious without providing 
such a teaching, suggestion, or motivation, seemed to fly in the face 
of this notion.47  Before moving on to a discussion of the USPTO’s 
seemingly violative official notice policy, however, it will be im-
portant to understand what the obviousness inquiry looks like in the 
trenches—as most often undertaken by a patent examiner at the 
USPTO.
48
   
  
 42. Id. at 424. 
 43. Id. at 425 (“The prior art discussed above leads us to the conclusion that 
attaching the sensor where both KSR and Engelgau put it would have been obvi-
ous to a person of ordinary skill.”). 
 44. Id. at 428. 
 45. See, e.g., id. at 421. 
 46. See Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance 
of Competition and Patent Law and Policy, ch. 4 at 12 (quoting Professor John 
Duffy as stating that the feel of the case law is that the courts only recognize 
teachings from the prior art). 
47.  See MPEP § 2144.03. 
 48. Of course, this is the same inquiry undertaken by federal district courts, the 
BPAI, and the Federal Circuit.  However, because the vast majority of patent ap-
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Let us consider a hypothetical patent application, which discloses 
two features, A and B.  The patent examiner to which the application 
is assigned then reads the application and begins a search for prior 
art that teaches A and B.  The easy case for the patent examiner, of 
course, is when he or she discovers a piece of prior art that teaches 
both A and B, which renders the claims unpatentable as anticipated 
under 35 U.S.C. § 102.
49
  The more difficult and more frequent case, 
however, occurs when a first reference teaches A and a second refer-
ence teaches B.
50
  To properly reject the patent application’s claims, 
however, the examiner is not permitted to simply cite the first and 
second references and declare the claims unpatentable.  Instead, the 
examiner must go one step further—providing a reason, most often 
stated in the prior art, why the PHOSITA would have been motivat-
ed to look to and combine the first and second references to arrive at 
the invention claimed in the application.  In essence, this stated mo-
tivation provides the “glue” for a proper § 103 obviousness rejec-
tion—affixing feature A and B together in such a way that satisfies 
the TSM test.  In practice, this “glue” comes directly from the lan-
guage of the first or the second reference, but it may also be taken 
from an independent third source. 
To make the process a bit clearer, let us imagine another hypo-
thetical patent application, filed by an inventor, Ingred.  Inventor 
Ingred’s patent application teaches a polysilicon gate terminal for a 
transistor with a gate terminal length of forty-five nanometers.  In-
gred’s application is assigned to Examiner Evan.  Evan reads In-
gred’s patent application and begins a prior art search.  During the 
search, Evan finds two relevant prior art patents, a patent to Anna 
and a patent to Brian.  Anna’s patent teaches a polysilicon gate ter-
minal for any transistor.  Brian’s patent teaches a metal gate terminal 
with a length of forty-five nanometers and states that decreasing the 
gate terminal length from previously longer gate lengths in transis-
  
plications are not litigated, the most relevant inquiry for the typical patentee is that 
of the patent examiner. 
 49. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2010). 
 50. See Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration 
that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1391, 1398 (2006). 
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tors increases computer processor speed and decreases overall physi-
cal processor size.  Here, Evan can properly reject Ingred’s claims as 
obvious because Anna teaches a polysilicon gate terminal and Brian 
teaches a gate terminal length of forty-five nanometers.  Further-
more, Brian teaches a motivation to combine the references: decreas-
ing the gate terminal length of a transistor increases the processor 
speed and decreases overall physical processor size.  Therefore, in 
this instance there exists an explicitly stated motivation that a 
PHOSITA could look to, and Examiner Evan could cite, in order to 
combine the prior art references. 
However, let us assume arguendo that the Brian patent, or any 
other prior art for that matter, does not explicitly teach that decreas-
ing the gate terminal length increases processor speed or decreases 
overall physical processor size.  Instead, let us assume that a com-
puter processor designer with ordinary skill at the time Ingred ap-
plied for her patent would have known that processor speed increas-
es with a decreasing gate length.  Let us further assume that this 
knowledge is based solely on a decade-old trend of shrinking transis-
tor gate lengths in the processor design field, but that the positive 
effects of the shrinking had not been explicitly documented or scien-
tifically explained in the prior art.  Rather, the ordinary processor 
designer at the time considered it common sense that shrinking pro-
cessor gate lengths led to a better-performing processor.  If Evan 
rejects Ingred’s claims based on the combination of Anna and Bri-
an’s patents, the motivation to combine would not be based on any 
readily-available and citable proposition in a piece of prior art.  Ra-
ther, the glue holding the pieces of prior art together for purposes of 
the § 103 rejection would consist of the “common sense” of the 
PHOSITA.  After KSR, such a motivation would justify an obvious-
ness rejection, so long as Evan clearly laid out his reasoning for us-
ing common sense as the glue.
51
   
Of course, the KSR Court upheld this practice of rejecting claims 
when common sense or common knowledge of the PHOSITA served 
as the examiner’s cited motivation to combine.  This practice is not 
as new as KSR may have made it seem, however.  In fact, the 
  
 51. See, e.g., Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1329 
(Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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USPTO examining corps has a long history of rejecting claims under 
§ 103 based on a motivation to combine or a claim element that does 
not have an explicit footing in prior art.  It is known as the examiner 
taking “official notice.”52 
At the outset, it is important to understand that official notice 
may take two forms in an obviousness rejection.  First, an examiner 
may take official notice that the PHOSITA would have been moti-
vated to combine two prior art references based on a subjective rea-
soning articulated by the examiner.  This, of course, was the case 
with Examiner Evan’s official notice in the hypothetical above.  This 
article will refer to these instances of official notice, taken to provide 
a motivation to combine prior art, as “motivational official notice.” 
Second, the examiner may take official notice that one of an ap-
plicant’s claim elements is well known in the art.  For example, in 
the hypothetical above, if Examiner Evan could not locate a prior art 
reference that taught a polysilicon transistor gate, he might take offi-
cial notice that polysilicon is often used as the transistor gate con-
ductor.  For purposes of this article, this type of official notice will 
be called “referential official notice.”  
Last, it is important to understand that the difference between a 
formal examiner invocation of official notice—be it motivational or 
referential—and an implicit finding of fact by an examiner or court 
based on common sense or common knowledge of the PHOSITA is 
truly negligible.  Explaining the difference is an exercise of seman-
tics: if an examiner chooses to formally take official notice, he or she 
places the words “official notice” in an office action; if he or she 
does not, but does not support his or her finding of fact on an explicit 
prior art teaching, the result is the same.  For clarity, however, this 
article will call the latter case “quasi-official notice”—a wonderful 
example of which can be found in the facts of KSR, presented above. 
  
 52. See MPEP § 2144.03. 
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IV. OFFICIAL NOTICE 
A. MPEP Official Notice Policy 
Official notice was developed in an effort to further several prac-
tical goals of the USPTO—decreasing patent pendency and the pa-
tent backlog, and increasing agency efficiency and flexibility of ex-
aminers’ analyses.53  The USPTO’s current policy on official notice 
is found in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”), 
which serves as the prudential guide for USPTO examiners when 
examining patent applications.
54
  In the MPEP, the USPTO conspic-
uously treats official notice, stating that “[i]n certain circumstances 
where appropriate, an examiner may take official notice of facts not 
in the record or rely on ‘common knowledge’ in making a rejection, 
however such rejections should be judiciously applied.”55   
The MPEP goes on to define both the substantive and procedural 
requirements of proper official notice practice.
56
  First, the MPEP 
explains the proper procedure for patent prosecution when the exam-
iner takes official notice in an obviousness rejection.  If an examiner 
does so, “[t]o adequately traverse such a finding, an applicant must 
specifically point out the supposed errors in the examiner’s action, 
which would include stating why the noticed fact is not considered 
to be common knowledge or well-known in the art.”57  If the appli-
cant traverses the examiner’s claim of official notice, the ball is in 
the examiner’s court to “provide documentary evidence in the next 
Office action if the rejection is to be maintained.”58  However, if the 
applicant fails to traverse the examiner’s use of official notice “the 
examiner should clearly indicate in the next Office action that the 
common knowledge or well-known in the art statement is taken to be 
  
 53. See, e.g., Lance Leonard Barry, Did You Ever Notice?  Official Notice in 
Rejections, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 129, 130–32 (Feb. 1999).; John 
S. Goetz, An “Obvious” Misunderstanding: Zurko, Lee and the Death of Official 
Notice (Part I), 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 150, 154 (Feb. 2004). 
 54. MPEP § 2144.03. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See id. 
 57. Id.; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.111(b) (2011). 
 58. MPEP § 2144.03; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(c)(2) (2011). 
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admitted prior art because applicant . . . failed to traverse the exam-
iner’s assertion of official notice . . . .”59 
Next, as to substance, the MPEP states: 
It would not be appropriate for the examiner to take official 
notice of facts without citing a prior art reference where the 
facts asserted to be well known are not capable of instant and 
unquestionable demonstration as being well-known.  For ex-
ample, assertions of technical facts in the areas of esoteric 
technology or specific knowledge of the prior art must al-
ways be supported by citation to some reference work recog-
nized as standard in the pertinent art. . . .  
It is never appropriate to rely solely on “common 
knowledge” in the art without evidentiary support in the rec-
ord . . . [and] an assessment of basic knowledge and common 




Furthermore, in its “summary” of proper official notice practice, 
the MPEP states that “any facts so noticed should be of notorious 
character and serve only to ‘fill in the gaps’ in an insubstantial man-
ner which might exist in the evidentiary showing made by the exam-
iner to support a particular ground for rejection.”61  Therefore, if an 
examiner takes official notice as to common sense or common 
knowledge of the PHOSITA, there must exist some form of explicit 
proof in the prior art to support the examiner’s assertion of fact.62 
However, the MPEP also discusses the situation where official 
notice is taken and it is unsupported by documentary evidence of any 
kind.  The MPEP mandates that, “[i]f such notice is taken, the basis 
for such reasoning must be set forth explicitly,” and, further, that 
“[t]he examiner must provide specific factual findings predicated on 
sound technical and scientific reasoning to support his or her conclu-
sion of common knowledge.”63  But this apparent examiner mandate 
  
 59. MPEP § 2144.03. 
 60. Id. (second emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. Id. 
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to utilize unsupported iterations of official notice is undermined by 
the MPEP’s admission that such practice is only founded upon “cer-
tain older cases.”64  Indeed, the most recent court decision that the 
MPEP cites to support this practice is In re Soli,
65
 which was decid-
ed by the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“CCPA”) 
nearly twenty years before the creation of the Federal Circuit.
66
  
Therefore, although the MPEP leaves the window open slightly for 
unsupported assertions of official notice, the modern validity of this 
practice is greatly diminished by the lack of recent case law condon-
ing it and the requirement that the examiner set out his or her reason-
ing with specific findings of fact, which ultimately may require the 
examiner to resort to a prior art citation.   
B. Judicial Development of Official Notice 
The current USPTO policy on official notice embodied in the 
MPEP is the result of a rich history of specific Federal Circuit case 
law on the subject that has been intermingled with and borrowed 
from general obviousness cases such as Graham and KSR.  As ex-
plained in Part III, the difference between quasi-official notice—as 
seen in KSR—and formal or explicit official notice is truly negligi-
ble; the difference being purely a matter of whether the words “offi-
cial notice” appear in the prosecution history of a particular patent.  
It is natural, therefore, that the body of official notice case law paral-
lels § 103 jurisprudence in that it has been rather inconsistent over 
the past half century—at times hinting at a policy favoring judicial 
deference to unsupported examiner official notice decisions, and at 
other times demanding that the official notice be based on an under-
lying prior art teaching in the record. 
Like the doctrine of obviousness itself, official notice finds its 
roots in case law.  In 1961, the CCPA decided In re Knapp-Monarch 
Co.,
67
 a trademark case that stated that “[j]udicial notice permits 
  
 64. Id. 
 65. 317 F.2d 941 (C.C.P.A. 1963). 
 66. MPEP § 2144.03.  The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created 
by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 
(1982). 
 67. 296 F.2d 230 (C.C.P.A. 1961). 
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proof by evidence to be dispensed with where common knowledge 
supports the truth of a proposition.”68  Furthermore, the Knapp court 
explained that 
Judicial notice also may be taken of facts ‘though they are 
neither actually notorious nor bound to be judicially known, 
yet they would be capable of such instant and unquestionable 
demonstration, if desired, that no party would think of im-
posing a falsity on the tribunal in the face of an intelligent 
adversary.’69 
In 1969, the CCPA expanded its jurisprudence on “judicial no-
tice”—which, in USPTO terms, is essentially an antiquated synonym 
for official notice—to the patent realm in In re Bozek.70  In Bozek, 
the CCPA upheld an examiner’s rejection, which was based on im-
plicit reasoning from a cited prior art patent that did not “specifically 
suggest[] the combination” of prior art.71  The court went further, 
stating that an examiner can rely “on a conclusion of obviousness 
‘from common knowledge and common sense of the person of ordi-
nary skill in the art without any specific hint or suggestion in a par-
ticular reference.’”72  Therefore, at the outset, the CCPA did not 
require that an examiner or the Board of Patent Appeals and Inter-
ferences (“BPAI”) base their use of official notice on a citable prior 
art proposition.  
However, a year later in 1920, the court retreated from its Bozek 
position in a seminal official notice case, In re Ahlert.
73
  After citing 
a patent to Ronay and referring to a patent to Van Swaal, the BPAI 
affirmed the examiner’s obviousness rejection, and “took judicial 
notice of the fact that it is common practice to postheat a weld after 
the welding operation is completed and held that to apply the heat to 
heat treat a weld does not distinguish patentably over Ronay, who 
  
 68. Id. at 232 (citing WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE Vol. IX, § 2565 (3d ed. 1940)). 
 69. Id. (emphasis added). 
 70. 416 F.2d 1385 (C.C.P.A. 1969). 
71.  Id. at 1390. 
 72. Id. (emphasis added). 
 73. 424 F.2d 1088 (C.C.P.A. 1970); see MPEP § 2144.03. 
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applies heat to weld the parts together or Van Swaal, who shows 
applying heat to a rail to heat treat the rail.”74   
In upholding the BPAI’s rejection and use of judicial notice, the 
CCPA in Ahlert laid out foundational principles of judicial notice in 
patent cases.
75
 Echoing Knapp, the court stated that the facts assert-
ed by official notice must be instantly available and unquestionable 
in validity.
76
  Further, the court cautioned that its rule on judicial 
notice “is not, however, as broad as it first might appear, and [the 
CCPA] will always construe it narrowly and will regard facts found 
in such manner with an eye toward narrowing the scope of any con-
clusions to be drawn therefrom.”77  Most importantly, the court held 
that a court or examiner must ultimately cite to a prior art document 
that sets out the facts underlying the use of official notice.
78
  
Over the next thirty years, the Federal Circuit routinely required 
that reasoning underlying an examiner’s invocation of official notice 
should be clearly articulated and founded on some objective teach-
ing, but also departed from Ahlert in some cases—leaving the door 
open for more subjective official notice formulations.
79
  Specifically, 
this line of cases reinforced the notion that a motivation to combine 
references could be “implicit,” or inferred from (1) knowledge of 
those skilled in the art or (2) from the nature of the problem to be 
solved
80—both of which ultimately amount to official notice if used 
without a citation.  For example, in a 1992 decision, the Federal Cir-
cuit stated that an examiner may properly establish a motivation to 
combine prior art references “only by showing some objective teach-
ing in the prior art or that knowledge generally available to one of 
ordinary skill in the art would lead that individual to combine the 
relevant teachings of the references.”81  Indeed, as one commenter 
  
 74. In re Ahlert, 424 F.2d at 1090 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 75. Id. at 1091–92. 
 76. Id. at 1091. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1091–92. 
 79. See, e.g., id. 
 80. See, e.g., Pro-Mold & Tool Co., Inc. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 
1568, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 81. In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (emphasis added).  Of 
course, this statement comports with the pre-KSR formulation of the TSM test as 
articulated above.  See sources cited supra note 16. 
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has noted, “[u]nder Federal Circuit case law [before KSR], a deci-
sion-maker [could] rely on an implicit suggestion or motivation to 
combine prior art references—the suggestion or motivation [did] not 
need to be recorded or documented.”82  However, in two particular 
pre-KSR opinions in the past decade, In re Zurko IV,
83
 and In re 
Lee,
84
 the Federal Circuit brought the official notice and TSM in-
quiry squarely in the realm of objectivity. 
C. In re Zurko: Show Us the Evidence 
In re Zurko IV, a 2001 Federal Circuit decision, established the 
proper standard of review for USPTO findings of fact, and was es-
sentially an administrative law decision at its core.
85
  Additionally, 
however, the case involved an unsupported motivation to combine 
that implicated both motivational and referential official notice, and 
an unusually lengthy procedural history.
86
   
Zurko’s invention was drawn to a computer system that involved 
“verifying a trusted command using both trusted and untrusted soft-
ware.”87  Trusted software is typically more expensive and involves 
more lines of code than untrusted software, so a user is able to save 
money and disk space when untrusted software is partially used in 
the place of trusted software.
88
  Specifically, Zurko’s invention al-
lowed the user to communicate with a trusted environment along a 
trusted communication path by using untrusted software to perform a 
command parsing step before that command is sent along the trusted 
path.
89
  Additionally, the application claimed that the parsed com-
mand was displayed for the user for verification before the system 
executed the command.
90
   
  
 82. Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-obvious II: Experimental Study on the 
Hindsight Issue Before the Supreme Court in KSR v. Teleflex, 9 YALE J.L. & 
TECH. 1, 29 (2006). 
 83. In re Zurko (Zurko IV), 258 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 84. In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 85. See Zurko IV, 258 F.3d at 1384. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 1382. 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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The examiner rejected Zurko’s claims under § 103 based on the 
combination of two prior art references: the UNIX operating system 
and a program called FILER 2.2.
91
  The UNIX prior art previously 
taught the use of trusted and untrusted code in a singular system.
92
  
The FILER 2.2 reference taught requesting a user to confirm the ex-
ecution of a potentially dangerous command instruction.
93
  The prior 
art, did not, however, explicitly teach the execution of the command 
along a trusted path.
94
  Instead, in rejecting Zurko’s claims, the ex-
aminer took quasi-referential official notice, asserting that “it is basic 
[common] knowledge that communication in trusted environments is 
performed over trusted paths”—and the BPAI affirmed this finding 
of fact.
95
  As to the motivation to combine the references, the BPAI 
upheld the examiner’s conclusion that such a motivation existed, 
taking motivational official notice that it “would have been nothing 
more than good common sense” to combine UNIX, FILER 2.2, and 
the fact from the examiner’s referential official notice.96   
On appeal to the Federal Circuit in Zurko I,
97
 the Federal Circuit 
held that the BPAI’s conclusions were clearly erroneous, and re-
versed the BPAI’s rejection.98  Specifically, the Zurko I court took 
issue with the BPAI’s finding that the prior art of record explicitly 
taught or implied the practice of utilizing a trusted pathway for user 
command confirmation.
99
  After the decision, the USPTO Commis-
sioner requested an en banc Federal Circuit rehearing of the case to 
determine the proper standard of review, arguing that the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (“APA”)100 mandated that the Federal Circuit 
must employ the substantial evidence or arbitrary and capricious 
standard of review.
101
  The en banc panel in Zurko II, however, held 
  
 91. In re Zurko (Zurko IV), 258 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 1382–83. 
 94. See id. at 1383. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 1383. 
 97. In re Zurko (Zurko I), 111 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 98. Id. at 889. 
 99. Id. 
100. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2010). 
101. Zurko IV, 258 F.3d at 1381. 
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that it had correctly employed review for clear error in Zurko I, and 
affirmed the original panel’s decision.102 
The Commissioner then petitioned the Supreme Court for re-
view, and the Court granted certiorari as to the proper standard of 
review for BPAI findings at the Federal Circuit.
103
  In Zurko III,
104
 
the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit, holding that BPAI 
decisions must be reviewed under the standards of review contem-
plated in the APA.105  In its opinion, the Court drew a distinction 
between court review of another court’s decision and a court review-
ing an agency decision—and determined that the APA standards of 
review clearly governed the latter, and that the clearly erroneous 
standard governed the former.106  Importantly, the Court also recog-
nized and spoke to an anomaly that its decision might have created, 
stating: 
An applicant denied a patent can seek review either directly 
in the Federal Circuit or indirectly by first obtaining direct 
review in federal district court.  The first path will now bring 
about Federal Circuit court/agency review; the second path 
might well lead to Federal Circuit court/court review, for the 
Circuit now reviews Federal District Court factfinding using  
a “clearly erroneous” standard. . . . 
We are not convinced, however, that the presence of the two 
paths creates a significant anomaly.  The second path per-
mits the disappointed applicant to present to the court evi-
dence that the applicant did not present to the PTO.
107
 
Additionally, the Court emphasized that the clear error and APA 
standards of review were nearly indistinguishable in practice: 
The court/agency standard, as we have said, is somewhat less 
strict than the court/court standard.  But the difference is a 




104. Dickinson v. Zurko (Zurko III), 527 U.S. 150 (1999). 
105.  See id. at 165. 
106.  Id. at 164. 
107. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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gle instance in which a reviewing court conceded that use of 
one standard rather than the other would in fact have pro-
duced a different outcome.
108
 
Therefore, although the Zurko III court mandated that the Federal 
Circuit apply an APA standard of review on direct appeals from the 
BPAI, it acknowledged that the difference in the clearly erroneous 
and APA standards of review is negligible.
109
   
On remand, the Federal Circuit was able to make a final determi-
nation as to the USPTO’s assertions of fact in their invocations of 
official notice in Zurko IV.  However, the court only found it neces-
sary to address the referential official notice in its opinion.
110
  As to 
the BPAI’s assertion that the basic knowledge or common sense of 
the PHOSITA would supply the trusted path teaching, the court held 
that the finding lacked substantial evidence support, stating: 
With respect to core factual findings in a determination of pa-
tentability . . . the Board cannot simply reach conclusions 
based on its own understanding or experience—or on its as-
sessment of what would be basic knowledge or common 
sense.  Rather, the Board must point to some concrete evi-
dence in the record in support of these findings.  To hold 
otherwise would render the process of appellate review for 
substantial evidence on the record a meaningless exercise.
111
 
Therefore, the Federal Circuit ultimately reversed the USPTO’s 
assertion of fact, one without a citation to an explicit source, as lack-
ing substantial evidence.  However, although the court had now set-
tled that referential official notice must be supported at the USPTO 
by an explicit teaching in the prior art, the court did not explicitly 
  
108. Id. at 162–63. 
109. See id.  Interestingly, the Court did not mandate which APA standard of 
review—substantial evidence or arbitrary and capricious—applied to BPAI ap-
peals surrounding findings of fact.  Before the Federal Circuit was able to rehear 
the case on remand from the Supreme Court, the court decided this question in In 
re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000), holding that it would apply 
substantial evidence review to these findings. 
110. Zurko IV, 258 F.3d at 1384. 
111. Id. at 1386 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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extend the same requirement to instances of motivational official 
notice until a year later in In re Lee.
112
 
D. In re Lee: The Federal Circuit Applies Zurko 
The invention in In re Lee was drawn to a method of automati-
cally displaying functions of a display and allowing the user to 
tweak the display functionality.
113
  The examiner cited two pieces of 
prior art in rejecting the claims, a patent to Nortrup and the Thunder-
chopper Helicopter Operations Handbook for a video game.
114
  
However, neither reference mentioned a user adjusting any display 
or audio functionality, and during the initial prosecution, the exam-
iner did not provide a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine 
the references.
115
  However, in the Examiner’s Answer at the BPAI, 
the examiner attempted to remedy this omission, stating that the 
combination:  
[W]ould have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art 
since [Thunderchopper’s] demonstration mode is just a pro-
grammable feature which can be used in many different de-
vices for providing automatic introduction by adding the 
proper programming software, and that another motivation 
would be that the automatic demonstration mode is user 
friendly and it functions as a tutorial.
116
   
The BPAI sided with the examiner, reasoning that “[t]he conclu-
sion of obviousness may be made from common knowledge and 
common sense of a person of ordinary skill in the art without any 
specific hint or suggestion in a particular reference.”117 
On appeal at the Federal Circuit, Lee asked for review of the 
USPTO’s findings as to its § 103 rejections.  The court found the 
USPTO’s motivation to combine inadequate under the APA—
holding that the conclusory justification for the rejection based on a 
  
112. 277 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
113. Id. at 1340. 
114. Id. at 1340–41. 
115. Id. at 1341. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
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“common sense” reasoning did not fulfill the USPTO’s obligation.118  
Indeed, as the court stated, “[c]ommon knowledge and common 
sense, even if assumed to derive from the agency’s expertise, do not 
substitute for authority when the law requires authority.”119 
Ultimately, therefore, Lee expanded the Federal Circuit’s holding 
in Zurko IV to motivational official notice—holding the USPTO’s 
feet to the fire by requiring that, under the APA, a motivation to 
combine must point to some explicit teaching in the prior art if it is 
to be upheld as proper.  As the court stated, “[t]his factual question 
of motivation is material to patentability, and could not be resolved 
on subjective belief and unknown authority.”120  After Zurko and 
Lee, it would seem that objective official notice—and, indeed, possi-
bly official notice in general—would become a remnant of the 
USPTO’s past.  However, the practice remained intact through 2007, 
and was arguably resurrected with the Supreme Court’s holding in 
KSR and the Federal Circuit’s KSR progeny. 
V. OBVIOUSNESS JURISPRUDENCE AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AFTER 
KSR 
After KSR, the Federal Circuit, federal district courts, the BPAI 
at the USPTO, and patent examiners themselves have been left to 
discern what the “common sense” of a PHOSITA entails practically.  
As examined above, KSR held that common sense could serve as a 
valid reason to reject a patent under § 103 and satisfy the TSM test.  
However, now that this paper has thoroughly examined official no-
tice practice, one can conclude that the KSR ruling conflicts drasti-
cally with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the APA in Zurko 
III, the Federal Circuit’s Zurko IV and Lee opinions, the MPEP’s 
current guidelines, and traditional tenets of official notice practice in 
cases like Kubin and Oetiker.  Before moving on to examine this 
conflict further and propose possible solutions to the quandary, it is 
important that one first becomes familiar with some important Fed-
  
118. In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
119. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
120. Id. at 1343–44. 
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eral Circuit cases after KSR and the current guidelines by which the 
USPTO abides when determining obviousness under § 103. 
A. Leapfrog and Perfect Web:  Expanding Common Sense 
Starting in Leapfrog Enterprises, Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc.,
121
 its 
first application of the KSR standard, the Federal Circuit has empha-
sized further that the obviousness inquiry and the TSM test are not 
slaves to explicit prior art teachings.  The patent-at-issue in Leapfrog 
was an electronic toy that assisted children in learning phonetical-
ly.
122
  The invention worked by displaying letters in a particular or-
der and eliciting a sound when certain letters were pressed.
123
  Addi-
tionally, a processor in the toy communicated with a “reader,” an 
electronic component that would decipher the identity of the set of 
letters to the processor.
124
  The trial court found that the only feature 
in the patent-at-issue not found in the prior art was the reader.
125
  
However, the court also held that the “knowledge of one of ordinary 
skill in the art” provided the motivation to add a reader to the com-




On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Leapfrog argued that there ex-
isted insufficient evidence on the record for the court to find a moti-
vation to combine the Bevan patent, the SSR, and the reader.
127
  
Naturally, Fisher-Price argued that, after KSR, a motivation to com-
bine references did not need to stem from the prior art references.
128
  
The Federal Circuit agreed with Fisher-Price, applying the “common 
sense” principle from KSR in stating that:  
An obviousness determination is not the result of a rigid for-
mula disassociated from the consideration of the facts of a 
  
121. 485 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
122. Id. at 1158. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 1162. 
126. Id. at 1159. 
127. Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1160 (Fed.. Cir. 
2007). 
128. Id. 
File: Sheets - Vol 10, Iss. 1, V4 Created on: 6/1/2012 2:03:00 PM Last Printed: 6/1/2012 2:04:00 PM 
2012 A LITTLE COMMON SENSE IS A DANGEROUS THING 187 
case.  Indeed, the common sense of those skilled in the art 
demonstrates why some combinations would have been ob-
vious where others would not.
129
   
The court held that a PHOSITA would have recognized adding a 
reader would have provided a simpler user experience and would 
have afforded the claimed invention added marketability to chil-
dren.
130
  In sum, based on a common sense-based motivation to 
combine prior art teachings—akin to an invocation of motivational 
official notice—the court agreed that the patent was invalid under 
§ 103.
131
   
Over the past couple of years, the court has consistently reaf-
firmed its Leapfrog holding and continued to expand the strength of 
implicit common sense rationales as valid motivations to combine.
132
  
Arguably the most aggressive stance on this principle—and the most 
relevant for the purpose of deciphering the status of current official 
notice jurisprudence—came in 2009 with the Federal Circuit’s deci-
sion in Perfect Web Technologies, Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc.
133
  Perfect 
Web involved a Perfect Web patent drawn to a method of emailing 
bulk messages to certain groups of individuals, assessing the num-
bers of emails sent, and repeating these steps—sending more emails 
until a minimum numbers of messages had been sent.
134
  The validi-
ty of the patent was challenged at the trial court level, where the 
court determined that the patent’s claims were invalid under 
§ 103.
135
  Specifically, the court found that although the step of re-
peating the email message transmissions was not explicitly taught in 
the prior art, “the final step is merely the logical result of common 
sense application of the maxim [to] ‘try, try again.’”136   
  
129. Id. at 1161 (emphasis added). 
130. Id. at 1162. 
131. Id. 
132. See, e.g., Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 
Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Limited Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d 984, 
993 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
133. 587 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
134. Id. at 1326. 
135. Id.  
136. Id. at 1327. 
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On appeal at the Federal Circuit, Perfect Web challenged the 
USPTO’s quasi-use of referential official notice on the “try, try 
again” maxim and argued that the PTO did not present a valid moti-
vation to combine to support its rejection.
137
  Furthering the Federal 
Circuit’s marked departure from Zurko and Lee, the court affirmed 
the district court’s rejection, holding that:  
[W]hile an analysis of obviousness always depends on evi-
dence that supports the required Graham factual findings, it 
also may include recourse to logic, judgment, and common 
sense available to the person of ordinary skill that do not 
necessarily require explication in any reference or expert 
opinion.
138
   
Though this holding drastically departed from precedent, the 
Perfect Web court recognized the ambiguity and attempted to ad-
dress it.
139
  Ultimately, however, it sidestepped the difficult issue and 
claimed that its reasoning was valid because, even in the wake of 
Zurko and Lee, “though common knowledge and common sense do 
not substitute for facts, they may be applied to analysis of the evi-
dence.”140   
The only specificity that the court mandated was that, when in-
voking common sense in a quasi-official notice manner, all the court 
or examiner must do is clearly lay out its reasoning, placing no limit 
on the reasoning’s subjectivity.  Specifically, the court held that 
“[t]he analysis that should be made explicit refers not to the teach-
ings in the prior art of a motivation to combine, but to the court’s 
analysis.”141  Therefore, in Perfect Web, the Federal Circuit, with the 
help of KSR, reopened the door for myriad common sense ration-
ales—whether they originate at the USPTO in the form of explicit 




137. Id at 1327–28. 
138. Id. at 1329 (emphasis added). 
139. Perfect Web Techs., Inc. V. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1328–29 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009). 
140. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
141. Id. at 1330 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
142. In In re Gleizer, 356 Fed. App’x 415 (Fed. Cir. 2009), the Federal Circuit 
briefly opined on the proper post-KSR obviousness inquiry when an examiner 
expressly invokes official notice.  The court’s treatment of official notice in 
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official notice findings, or at the federal district courts in validity 
litigation. 
Partially in response to the ambiguity created by KSR and its ap-
plication in Perfect Web, the USPTO published interim guidelines 
for the examination of patents for obvious subject matter on Septem-
ber 1, 2010.
143
  The guidelines recognize the inherent inconsistency 
between In re Lee and KSR, and suggest that Lee may no longer be a 
viable holding, “insofar as Lee appears to require a strict basis in 
record evidence as a reason to modify the prior art.”144  Instead, the 
guidelines echo language from Perfect Web and Ball Aerosol which 
both held that for a court or an examiner to supply a properly “ex-
plicit” reasoning simply means that they articulate the common 
sense, common knowledge, reasoning, inferences, or creative steps 
that the PHOSITA would have employed to render a particular claim 
obvious.
145
  Additionally, although the guidelines do not explicitly 
mention official notice practice, as explained above, the doctrines of 
obviousness and official notice have a fundamentally interwoven 
relationship, as official notice serves as a still viable means by which 
an examiner may reject a claim under § 103 based on common sense 
or common knowledge. 
B. The Inherent Contradiction Between KSR and Official Notice 
Several foundational conflicts exist with the post-KSR obvious-
ness standard and the stated USPTO official notice policy.  On one 
hand, Zurko IV stands for the proposition that all USPTO findings of 
  
Gleizer, however, was unfortunately brief and lacked meaningful bite because it 
was able to uphold the official notice on procedural grounds—namely, because the 
applicant did not object to the examiner’s invocation during prosecution. Id. at 
420.  However, it is telling that the court seemingly would have upheld the official 
notice on the merits, citing Leapfrog and stating, “[a]n obviousness determination 
is not the result of a rigid formula disassociated from the consideration of the facts 
of a case” and “common sense of those skilled in the art demonstrates why some 
combinations would have been obvious where others would not.”  Id. at 420–21.  
This would seem to reaffirm the notion that, naturally, as general obviousness 
goes, so goes official notice. 
143. Examination Guidelines Update: Developments in the Obviousness Inquiry 
After KSR v. Teleflex, 75 Fed. Reg. 53643 (Sept. 1, 2010). 
144. Id. 
145. See MPEP § 2144.03. 
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fact, including the existence of a motivation to combine, must be 
supported by substantial evidence and must point to an explicit 
teaching in the prior art.  On the other hand, KSR and its progeny 
stand for the proposition that such findings of fact are proper absent 
explicit prior art support.  Therein lies the problem as official notice 
currently stands: is an unsupported assertion of fact by an examiner 
citing only common knowledge or common sense of the PHOSITA 
proper, or must there be prior art support?   
Though it attempts to address the problem, the MPEP is of no 
practical help as currently written.  The MPEP reiterates that the 
APA substantial evidence standard applies to examiner invocations 
of official notice and cites Zurko IV on several occasions, stating that 
“an assessment of basic knowledge and common sense that is not 
based on any evidence in the record lacks substantial evidence sup-
port.”146  However, the current official notice section of the MPEP 
does not once cite KSR or its progeny, which stand for the polar op-
posite position on the matter—that in fact no such prior evidence is 
needed to sustain a determination of obviousness.
147
  Therefore, alt-
hough the USPTO official notice policy seems to ultimately require 
an underlying prior art document, after KSR, it appears no such prior 
art document is necessary. 
Instead, obvious jurisprudence has settled on allowing examiners 
to reject patent claims on their understanding of what constitutes 
common knowledge or common sense, so long as they explain their 
reasoning, no matter how subjective that reasoning may be.  Though 
the USPTO has not spoken directly to this issue as to formal official 
notice practice, it is natural that such reasoning would be allowed 
with formal invocations of official notice as well as quasi-official 
notice situations.  As a practical result, it is much easier for an exam-
iner to justify use of official notice after KSR, but if he or she were to 
consult the MPEP on the matter, this conclusion would not seem so 
plain.   
Of course, allowing examiners recourse to subjectivity enhances 
the values that official notice was created to further: agency efficien-
cy, a reduced patent backlog, and flexibility in analysis.  However, 
  
146. MPEP § 2144.03. 
147. See id. 
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these positive justifications for official notice come at a cost of prop-
er agency action as defined in Zurko and Lee by denying patent ap-
plicants a potential property interest without an explanation as to 
which explicit evidence the agency is relying upon to come to its 
decision.  Therefore, the current quandary surrounding obviousness 
has a tangible impact on applicants, USPTO patent examiners, dis-
trict courts, and patent practitioners alike. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As to the ultimate solution to the current doctrinal problem, the 
USPTO, Congress, or the judiciary could individually attempt to 
fashion a workable solution.  First, as to the USPTO, as proposed in 
the previous section, the agency could update its MPEP official no-
tice guidelines to more accurately portray the post-KSR obviousness 
landscape.  However, this solution would be purely superficial, as 
the underlying conflict between Zurko and KSR still exists.  Alterna-
tively, Congress could consider a bill that sets out what it deems to 
be the correct obviousness and official notice procedure to be applied 
by the USPTO and the courts.  However, the likelihood that such a 
bill would be passed by Congress, let alone be introduced, seems 
very low given the limited success of similar patent reform bills in-
troduced in the past decade. 
This, of course, leaves the judiciary.  The Federal Circuit is clear 
on where it stands on motivations to combine based on common 
sense and common knowledge—after Perfect Web, such findings are 
clearly proper in the court’s opinion.  However, the solution to this 
problem will likely not come from the Federal Circuit.  After all, the 
conflict between Zurko III and KSR is a conflict between Supreme 
Court opinions, which calls for a Supreme Court solution.  In KSR, 
the Supreme Court failed to properly comprehend the effect of its 
decision on administrative procedure as it specifically relates to the 
problem with which it was presented—proper § 103 practice—and 
unintentionally affected the role of official notice in patent prosecu-
tion and litigation that may eventually stem from such prosecution.  
Therefore, the ultimate solution to the official notice problem lies in 
the Court granting certiorari on an obviousness case implicating 
common sense as a motivation to combine and taking KSR a step 
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further.  This step would likely require the Court to expressly over-
rule its Zurko III decision and understand that they must properly 
interpret the APA as it relates to obviousness review.   
Alternatively, the Court could take a step back from its deferen-
tial stance in KSR and require that all determinations of obviousness 
must ultimately be supported by some explicit teaching in the prior 
art.   
Practically, this solution serves as the best course on which the 
Court should steer § 103 jurisprudence.  The fact of the matter is, if a 
fact is so well-known as to consider it common knowledge, someone 
has likely written it down.  If it has not been written down, the fact 
that supports the invention is more than likely deserving of patent 
protection.  To keep the obviousness inquiry in the realm of subjec-
tivity—based on the not-so-common benchmark of common sense—
unnecessarily undermines the validity of issued patents and arguably 
places too much power in the hands of a single examiner, a decision-
maker with often insufficient training and expertise to be wholly 
conversant in the technology that they are examining. 
Indeed, as In re Ahlert held, and as the current MPEP section on 
official notice states:  
Official notice unsupported by documentary evidence should 
only be taken by the examiner where the facts asserted to be 
well-known, or to be common knowledge in the art are capa-
ble of instant and unquestionable demonstration as being 
well-known.
148
   
The USPTO should keep the bar high when it comes to official 
notice invocation and hold its examiners’ feet to the fire when it 
comes to supporting assertions of fact—because without underlying 





148. MPEP § 2144.03. 
